Universo corporativo en expansión. Gobierno corporativo, interlocking directorates y su relación con las redes corporativas y el derecho de la competencia
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.51302/ceflegal.2019.9885Palabras clave:
gobierno corporativo, poder corporativo, consejo de administración, interlocking directorates, redes corporativas, derecho de la competenciaResumen
El presente trabajo tiene por objeto analizar ciertos aspectos de los denominados consejeros compartidos o interlocking directorates, miembros de los consejos de administración. Esta figura, tradicionalmente estudiada por la Sociología, puede dar lugar a la existencia de redes corporativas, así como influenciar en el juego de la competencia dentro de los mercados. Se pretende, a nivel general, acotar determinados conceptos sobre esta materia que resulten de utilidad a fin de que la praxis corporativa cumpla con el marco legal y regulatorio.
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