Corporate expanding universe. Corporate governance, interlocking directorates and its relationship with the corporate networks and the competition law
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.51302/ceflegal.2019.9885Keywords:
corporate governance, corporate power, board of directors, interlocking directorates, corporate networks, competition lawAbstract
The subject matter of this paper is to analyze certain aspects of the so-called interlocking directorates, members of the board of directors. This figure, usually studied by the Sociology, may imply the existence of corporate networks as well as influence the Competition within the markets. On a general basis, it is intended to fix certain concepts on this matter which may be useful for the corporate praxis to be compliance with the legal and regulatory frame.
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