El gobierno corporativo, la estrategia de diversificación y los resultados: evidencia en las cajas de ahorros españolas

Autores/as

  • María Gracia García Soto Profesora Asociada. Departamento de Economía y Dirección de Empresas. Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (España)
  • Juan Manuel García Falcón Catedrático de Universidad. Departamento de Economía y Dirección de Empresas. Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (España)
  • Francisca Rosa Álamo Vera Titular de Universidad. Departamento de Economía y Dirección de Empresas. Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (España)

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.51302/rcyt.2005.15907

Resumen

La mayor parte de los debates abiertos sobre el gobierno de las empresas se ha centrado en las entidades de capital, siendo muy pocos los estudios que se han orientado al análisis del comportamiento de organizaciones que no cuentan con estructura de propiedad, como es el caso de las cajas de ahorros. En los últimos años, existe una gran sensibilidad por avanzar en el estudio del gobierno de las cajas de manera que estas entidades puedan preservar su identidad en un sector tan competitivo como es el financiero. Ante esta situación, el presente trabajo de investigación pretende enmarcarse en el movimiento de reformas que se ha venido produciendo durante los últimos años en los modos de organizar el gobierno de las sociedades, hallándose entre las causas de estas reformas una constante: la separación entre propiedad y gestión. Por tanto, valiéndonos de la teoría de la agencia como marco teórico, el presente trabajo de investigación trata de responder a la siguiente pregunta: ¿influye el gobierno corporativo de la organización en la estrategia de diversificación y en los resultados empresariales? Los resultados obtenidos muestran que, con carácter general, los mejores resultados del sector se relacionan con: una mayor diversificación de negocios, mayor dimensión de los consejos, menor participación de los empleados, presidentes sin cargos ejecutivos con experiencia en el sector y una mayor actividad de la comisión ejecutiva, así como con una dimensión mediana de las entidades.

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07-05-2005

Cómo citar

García Soto, M. G., García Falcón, J. M., & Álamo Vera, F. R. (2005). El gobierno corporativo, la estrategia de diversificación y los resultados: evidencia en las cajas de ahorros españolas. Revista De Contabilidad Y Tributación. CEF, (266), 161–212. https://doi.org/10.51302/rcyt.2005.15907