Resiliencia contable: gobierno corporativo y transparencia bancaria
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.51302/rcyt.2022.7499Palabras clave:
banca, transparencia, provisiones por préstamos incobrables, consejo de administraciónResumen
Las dos últimas crisis (la financiera desencadenada a partir de 2008 y la actual provocada por la COVID-19) han mostrado dos facetas distintas del sistema bancario: mientras que aquella expuso su vulnerabilidad a los riesgos asumidos, esta última ha mostrado su denodado esfuerzo por atenuar los devastadores efectos económicos, a pesar del riesgo que esa política comporta. Sin embargo, en ambos casos subyace la cuestión sobre cómo fortalecer la arquitectura corporativa de los bancos para mejorar la información que proporcionan. En el presente trabajo estudiamos la relación existente entre la configuración del consejo de administración y la transparencia contable (entendida como reconocimiento del riesgo a través de la dotación a las provisiones por préstamos incobrables) de una muestra de 1.352 bancos de 52 países entre 2000 y 2019. Obtenemos una relación con el tamaño del consejo en forma de U invertida, coherente con la idea de un entorno óptimo del número de consejeros. Asimismo, encontramos un efecto positivo de la independencia, de la permanencia y de la diversidad (en términos de presencia femenina) de los consejos.
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