Valoración de los inversores de la adopción de prácticas de Buen Gobierno por las empresas españolas cotizadas
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.51302/rcyt.2002.16439Palabras clave:
Gobierno corporativo, Consejo de Administración, Códigos de Buen Gobierno, Código Olivencia, valor de la empresaResumen
Este trabajo ha sido seleccionado y obtenido el 1.er Premio Estudios Financieros 2002 en la Modalidad de contabilidad y administración de empresas.
El presente trabajo analiza la reacción del mercado bursátil ante el anuncio de cumplimiento de las recomendaciones del Código de Buen Gobierno o Código Olivencia realizadas por las empresas españolas. Asimismo, se estudia cómo las diferentes estructuras de gobierno previas de las empresas contribuyen a explicar dicha reacción. Los resultados obtenidos sugieren que el mercado bursátil reacciona positivamente ante los anuncios de adopción de las recomendaciones del Código si éstos informan de una reestructuración profunda del Consejo de Administración, mientras que dicha reacción no es significativa para los anuncios de adopción de ciertas recomendaciones aisladas. Se observa también una mayor reacción del mercado para el caso de empresas menos endeudadas y para aquéllas con mayor presencia de consejeros ejecutivos en su Consejo de Administración. Los resultados obtenidos sugieren que el mercado valora la adopción de las recomendaciones del Código como una forma de control a los flujos de caja libres en aquellas empresas en las que existe un menor control por la vía del endeudamiento y en las que los gestores tienen una mayor capacidad para realizar un uso discrecional del mismo dada su elevada representación en el Consejo de Administración.
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