Riesgo corporativo y crisis financiera: el papel de los inversores institucionales
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.51302/rcyt.2013.6457Palabras clave:
accionistas de referencia, desregulación financiera, oportunidades de crecimiento, inversores institucionales, riesgo de la empresaResumen
Este trabajo ha obtenido el Accésit Premio Estudios Financieros 2013 en la modalidad de Contabilidad.
Teniendo en cuenta que los inversores institucionales han jugado un papel importante en la propagación de la crisis financiera a la economía real, el presente trabajo analiza el comportamiento de inversores institucionales activos y pasivos en un periodo de desregulación financiera. Así, se estudia la relación entre la estructura de la propiedad institucional y el riesgo corporativo para una muestra de empresas de 21 países de la OCDE para el periodo 2001-2008. Nuestros resultados sugieren que, en un proceso de desregulación financiera, la falta de un mecanismo de control eficaz ha dado lugar a un exceso de inversión en proyectos de elevado riesgo por parte de los inversionistas institucionales. También encontramos que los inversores institucionales pasivos como los bancos se han comportado como inversores activos, aumentando los niveles de riesgo corporativo.
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