Préstamos entre partes relacionadas y calidad de la información contable. El papel moderador de la presencia de mujeres en el consejo de administración
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.51302/rcyt.2023.11467Palabras clave:
préstamos entre partes relacionadas, calidad de la información contable, accionistas controladores, diversidad de géneroResumen
Los recientes escándalos corporativos han situado en el punto de mira a las operaciones de préstamos entre partes relacionadas (PPR), acrecentando el interés por su impacto en la calidad de la información contable divulgada por las empresas. En el ámbito académico, la evidencia empírica disponible ha adoptado una perspectiva internacional, centrándose en el contexto asiático. En el presente trabajo analizamos el efecto de los préstamos entre partes relacionadas en la calidad de la información contable en una muestra de empresas cotizadas españolas durante el periodo 2005-2019. Nuestros resultados muestran un efecto negativo de los préstamos entre partes relacionadas en la calidad de la información contable. Estos hallazgos son consistentes con la utilización oportunista de los préstamos entre partes relacionadas por parte de quienes detentan el control efectivo la empresa, lo que conlleva un aumento de sus incentivos a disminuir la calidad de la información contable reportada. Asimismo, proporcionamos evidencia de que la presencia de mujeres en el consejo de administración mitiga el efecto negativo de los PPR en la calidad de la información contable divulgada.
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