Empresas políticamente conectadas y credibilidad de la información contable
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.51302/rcyt.2013.6441Palabras clave:
consejero político, conexión política, capacidad informativaResumen
Este trabajo ha obtenido el 1.er Premio Estudios Financieros 2013 en la modalidad de Contabilidad.
El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar la incidencia de la presencia de consejeros políticos en la credibilidad de la información contable divulgada por la empresa. A partir de una muestra de sociedades no financieras cotizadas españolas a lo largo del periodo 2003-2011 se muestra como en torno al 48 % de las empresas cuentan con al menos un consejero político y un incremento de políticos de alto nivel consejeros de las sociedades cotizadas a lo largo del periodo analizado. Además, los resultados muestran una incidencia negativa de la presencia de conexiones políticas en la credibilidad de los resultados contables, como consecuencia de la presencia de un efecto información que conlleva que tanto accionistas como políticos estén interesados en ofrecer al mercado la menor información posible. Asimismo, nuestro trabajo evidencia que en las empresas políticamente conectadas a medida que aumenta la divergencia entre los derechos de voto y cash flow en manos del propietario dominante aumenta la capacidad informativa de los resultados contables. Este resultado es consistente con la presencia de un efecto alineamiento que conlleva una disminución de los incentivos a la expropiación de rentas a los minoritarios ante un aumento de la preocupación por la reputación en escenarios de alto escrutinio público y social.
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