Modelos de gobierno corporativo en España y el Reino Unido: dos caminos hacia la creación de valor
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.51302/rcyt.2010.6977Palabras clave:
gobierno corporativo, protección legal al inversor, creación de valor, marco institucionalResumen
Este trabajo analiza, para una muestra de 216 empresas procedentes de España y el Reino Unido y para un periodo de cuatro años (2000-2003), la influencia de la concentración de propiedad, el tamaño del consejo y la deuda en el resultado, con el objetivo de obtener evidencia de la influencia del marco legal en el diseño de los mecanismos de gobierno. Los resultados muestran que la protección legal ofrecida a los inversores en cada país determina el uso de los mecanismos internos de gobierno, siendo la concentración de la propiedad y la protección legal al inversor mecanismos sustitutivos a la hora de incrementar el valor de la empresa, condicionando el uso del resto de mecanismos.
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