Regulating markets in the digital era: Quo vadis, European Union?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.51302/ceflegal.2020.9675Keywords:
digitization, competition policy, big data, digital platformsAbstract
These years have witnessed profound changes in market structure and businesses models, due to the digitization of the economy. Although the European Union aims to create an authtentic digital single market, truth nowdays is that American companies such as Google, Facebook, Amazon or Apple are the ones leading the path. In this paper we examine what regulatory answer is the EU giving to this challenge of new digital markets. Prominent features of such competitive environment are examined, such as: big data, digital platforms, abusive conduct by high-tech companies, vertical restraints in e-commerce distribution and digital mergers. We pay close attention to the recent report issued in April 2019 by the European Commission, Competition Policy for the Digital Era. A first glance of the report suggests an unfavourable assessment, given its culpability presumption and unfounded suspicion on digital enterprises, which, certainly, does not support innovation and digital entrepreneurship in the EU.
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