El consejo de administración como mecanismo de gobierno de la empresa: fundamentos teóricos y evidencia empírica en los países de la OCDE
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.51302/rcyt.2001.16573Resumen
El debate académico y empresarial sobre la eficiencia de los mecanismos de gobierno corporativo se centra en la estructura y funcionamiento de los consejos de administración de las empresas. Este trabajo intenta encontrar evidencia empírica adicional al respecto, analizando el efecto que el tamaño, la composición y modo de funcionamiento de los consejos de administración tienen sobre el valor de la empresa.
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