Análisis de los efectos de los Planes de Opciones sobre Acciones (POA) en el marco del Behavioral Agency Model (BAM)
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.51302/rtss.2004.8827Resumen
Este trabajo ha sido seleccionado y ha obtenido el 1.er Premio Estudios Financieros 2004 en la modalidad de Recursos Humanos.
En el presente trabajo revisaremos los Planes de Opciones sobre Acciones para Ejecutivos (POA), en base a las conclusiones empíricas obtenidas durante décadas de investigación en el área del comportamiento de los individuos en condiciones de riesgo e incertidumbre, y comprobaremos cómo el actual diseño de los POA entregados a los equipos directivos de la mayor parte de empresas puede explicar algunas de las evidencias empíricas observadas durante los últimos años, como son por ejemplo las significativas reducciones en los pagos de dividendos de las empresas americanas observadas durante los últimos años. Concretamente, en el presente trabajo analizaremos los POA en el marco del modelo de comportamiento del directivo denominado Behavioral Agency Model (BAM), desarrollado por Wiseman y Gómez-Mejía (1998). En base a este modelo veremos cómo, de hecho, la gran mayoría de los POA en uso en la actualidad pueden incentivar al Chief Executive Officer (CEO) a reducir significativamente la búsqueda de nuevas oportunidades de inversión y crecimiento para la empresa, con el único objetivo de proteger el valor contenido en dichos POA. Asimismo, en base a los supuestos del BAM, dado que el consejero delegado está más comprometido en la protección del actual valor de sus POA más que en aumentar dicho valor, el BAM predice que los directivos tenderán a reducir los pagos de dividendos de la empresa, de nuevo, con el único objetivo de proteger así el valor contenido en sus POA.
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