La retribución en los contratos de alta dirección: determinantes y contenido
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.51302/rtss.1999.17873Resumen
La política retributiva es, sin lugar a dudas, una de las dimensiones que más interés está despertando en el campo de la Dirección y Gestión de Recursos Humanos actuales. En este trabajo, la autora propone un modelo propio de análisis de este factor aplicado a la Alta Dirección. El interés del artículo radica, por tanto, no sólo en el valor que aportan las conclusiones del mismo, sino también en el valor metodológico que tiene el modelo de análisis propuesto.
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