On the limits of the sanctioning power of the State Public Employment Service
Apropos of Supreme Court Ruling 293/2024, February 14
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.51302/rtss.2024.22337Keywords:
benefit, unemployment, sanction, control, SEPE, suspension, terminationAbstract
Since Supreme Court Ruling 731/2017 of 27 September, jurisprudence has understood that the mention that article 271.1 g) of the General Social Security Act makes the obligations of article 299 refer solely and exclusively to transfers and stays of more than 15 days and less than 12 months or 90 days respectively. Thus, the unemployment benefit is extinguished if the maximum thresholds are exceeded, since transfers or stays will not be covered as a cause for suspension (art. 272, f) General Social Security Act); or for departures from the national territory of more than 15 days not communicated to the State Public Employment Service nor authorized by it, but in this case as a consequence of the imposition of a sanction (Supreme Court Ruling 71/2020, of January 28 and 77/2024, of January 19). What is analysed in the ruling that is the subject of this commentary are the limits of the administrative sanction, for infringement of the provisions of articles 25.3 and 47.1 b) of the Law on offences and sanctions in the social order, committed by a beneficiary of unemployment benefits when she failed to comply with her duty to notify the State Public Employment Service of her departure from Spanish territory for a period of more than 15 days.
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- 2024-07-02 (2)
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