Activismo accionarial y retribución directiva: la influencia del say-on-pay en las empresas cotizadas españolas

Gabriel Lozano Reina; Gregorio Sánchez Marín; Juan Samuel Baixauli Soler

doi:10.51302/rtss.2023.3359

Authors

Gabriel Lozano Reina Profesor ayudante doctor en el Departamento de Organización de Empresas y Finanzas. Facultad de Economía y Empresa. Universidad de Murcia (España) https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1225-3422
Gregorio Sánchez Marín Catedrático de Organización de Empresas en el Departamento de Economía y Dirección de Empresas. Facultad de Economía, Empresa y Turismo. Universidad de Alcalá (España) https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0175-814X
Juan Samuel Baixauli Soler Catedrático de Economía Financiera y Contabilidad del Departamento de Organización de Empresas y Finanzas. Decano de la Facultad de Economía y Empresa. Universidad de Murcia (España) https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2444-6894

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.51302/rtss.2023.3359

Keywords:

say-on-pay, SOP, shareholder activism, executive compensation, aligned compensation, corporate governance, Spanish listed companies

Abstract

This paper has won a runner-up prize in the Financial Studies 2022 Award in the Human Resources category.

The say-on-pay (SOP) is a voting held at the annual general meeting that allows shareholders to express their views –by voting in favor, against or by abstaining– on executive compensation. This voting, originally implemented by the United Kingdom in 2002, has been implemented in many countries with different typologies. There is still controversy about the effectiveness of this voting, with the Spanish context being of special interest due to its corporate governance particularities. Based on a sample of Spanish listed companies from 2013 to 2020, the aim of this paper is to analyze the effects of SOP on CEO compensation designs by analyzing the degree of shareholder activism existing as well as the impact of voting results on CEO compensation designs. Our results state that the SOP stimulates the participation of shareholders in corporate governance matters related to pay issues, in addition to encouraging CEO compensation more aligned with firm performance.

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Author Biographies

Gabriel Lozano Reina, Profesor ayudante doctor en el Departamento de Organización de Empresas y Finanzas. Facultad de Economía y Empresa. Universidad de Murcia (España)

Profesor ayudante doctor en el Departamento de Organización de Empresas y Finanzas de la Universidad de Murcia (España). Su labor investigadora se centra en el gobierno corporativo, la gestión de recursos humanos y la empresa familiar. Tiene casi una decena de artículos publicados en revistas científicas internacionales de alto impacto como Journal of Family Business Strategy, Human Resource Management Review, Management Decision o BRQ-Business Research Quarterly. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1225-3422

Gregorio Sánchez Marín, Catedrático de Organización de Empresas en el Departamento de Economía y Dirección de Empresas. Facultad de Economía, Empresa y Turismo. Universidad de Alcalá (España)

Catedrático de Organización de Empresas en el Departamento de Economía y Dirección de Empresas de la Universidad de Alcalá (España). Tiene reconocidos cuatro sexenios y sus ámbitos de interés en investigación abarcan principalmente la dirección de recursos humanos y la gestión de empresas familiares. Ha publicado más de cincuenta artículos en revistas científicas internacionales de prestigio como Journal of Business Ethics, Family Business Review, Journal of Business Research, Human Resource Management Review o Journal of Small Business Management. Además, ha sido subdirector de la Agencia Nacional de Evaluación de la Calidad y Acreditación (ANECA) en el Ministerio de Universidades. https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0175-814X

Juan Samuel Baixauli Soler, Catedrático de Economía Financiera y Contabilidad del Departamento de Organización de Empresas y Finanzas. Decano de la Facultad de Economía y Empresa. Universidad de Murcia (España)

Catedrático de universidad en Economía Financiera y Contabilidad del Departamento de Organización de Empresas y Finanzas. Ha desempeñado una labor investigadora ininterrumpida, publicando más de cuarenta artículos en revistas de alto impacto como Journal of Business Research, European Journal of Finance, Journal of Business Ethics, Journal of Financial Research o Computational Economics. Cuenta con la evaluación positiva de tres tramos de investigación y uno de transferencia. Actualmente es decano de la Facultad de Economía y Empresa de la Universidad de Murcia (España). https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2444-6894

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